We examine socio-economic indicators relevant to 'low cost carriers' (LCCs) in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and review the evolution of air transport liberalization and air service agreements in the region. We analyse the business strategies of MENA-based LCCs and using a benchmarking methodology, we compare the business strategy of Air Arabia Group with those of dominant European LCCs easyJet and Ryanair. Our economic development indicators suggest future potential for LCC growth in Iran and Saudi Arabia while other MENA countries continue to face challenges. The lack of success in regional liberalization in air transport is restricting LCC growth although individual MENA countries have or will benefit from 'open skies' agreements. MENA-based LCCs while retaining some characteristics of the LCC model also deviate in significant ways. Benchmarking analysis shows that Air Arabia's business strategy represents a departure from the business strategies that have been most successful in Europe.
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Introduction
This paper explores the current environment, prospects and strategies of so-called 'low cost airlines' (LCCs) in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.
3 Specifically, we examine economic development indicators to determine the general environment facing LCCs, we review the evolution of air transport liberalisation and air service agreements and we compare the business strategies of MENA-based airlines in the low cost sector with those of successful European LCCs.
The MENA region has recorded impressive growth in air passenger traffic in recent respectively and over the same period passenger traffic within the MENA region also increased 22%. 4 While such growth is impressive, the MENA LCC sector currently accounts for a much smaller market share compared with LCCs elsewhere in the world. In 2014, LCCs accounted for 15% of available seat kilometers within the Middle East and 7% to/from the Middle East.
Similarly, within Africa LCCs account for around 10% of total seat capacity. 5 These market shares are significantly lower than those for LCCs in Europe, North America and Southeast Asia.
Why have LCCs in the MENA region not been more successful relative to their counterparts around the world? One potential reason is that the region is at stage in its economic development in which inhibits faster growth for LCCs. One might also consider whether a lack of trade liberalization in air services has created a more restrictive environment for the low cost sector in MENA countries. Thirdly, it is possible that MENA-based LCCs differ in their business strategies in ways that result in lower market shares. We investigate all of these potential explanations.
We begin with an economic overview of MENA countries that attempts to identify possible indicators of demand for air transport and for LCCs in particular. In section 3, we review the recent history and current state of intra-regional and inter-regional air transport 3 MENA encompasses Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, the Palestinian territories, Qatar, Saudi Arabia (KSA), Syria, Tunisia, Yemen and United Arab Emirates (UAE). 4 See Amadeus (2014) 5 OAG (2012) , CAPA (2013) . Note that the LCC shares of capacity for within the African continent overstates the current role of LCCs in Northern countries as much of the LCC presence is in South Africa.
2 liberalization agreements and in section 4 we examine the characteristics and evolution of MENA-based 'LCCs' and utilize a benchmarking methodology to compare the business strategy of Air Arabia Group with those of established European LCCs easyJet and Ryanair. We offer some concluding remarks in section 5.
Economic Indicators of LCC Sector Growth
Data availability for MENA countries is a challenge, however we have assessed the current environment and potential for growth in air transport (and LCCs in particular) using five indicators;
1. Macroeconomic (GDP) growth -a general indicator for air travel demand. 2. Median income per capita -a proxy for the size of the middle income class. 3. Urban development and geography -measuring the extent to which there are cities within a country that can support domestic LCC travel. 4. Internet penetration -a measure of the ability of airlines to sell directly to their customers via online distribution and sales. 5. The trend in foreign visitor spending -a proxy for the extent to which a country is becoming a destination for inbound air passengers.
In general, growth in air transport is correlated with macroeconomic growth and associated macroeconomic shocks. 6 Table 1 shows the size of MENA economies and macroeconomic growth over the last five years along with GDP per capita. In 2014, 75% of MENA economic output was accounted for by oil exporting countries and 22% by Saudia Arabia alone. With the exception of Iran, Kuwait and Libya, the oil exporting MENA countries have recorded higher GDP growth rates than the global rate of 2.49%. Among oil importing countries, Jordan and
Tunisia also recorded superior rates of macroeconomic growth with Israel and Morocco growing at around the global rate. Per capita GDP varies wildly across MENA countries from $3,036
(Egypt) to $96,732 (Qatar) however this tells us little about the distribution of income.
An important contributory element in domestic demand for low cost air travel demand is a growing middle class. As Schlumberger and Weisskopf (2014) argue, without a middle income class even low airfares are unaffordable to a large segment of a given domestic population.
Measuring the size of a country's middle class is a non-trivial exercise that requires data concerning both the amount and distribution of income. Gini coefficient measures Even if this dollar figure is biased downwards, it indicates a very large gap between per capita GDP and the actual incomes of many citizens and residents. 7 The same Gini coefficient value can be obtained from different distribution functions. For example, a Gini coefficient of 50 could be derived from an income distribution in which half of the population have all the income and the other half have nothing or from a distribution in which 20% of the population are extremely wealthy, 60% of the population are quite poor and 20% have nothing. As a benchmark, the US and Canadian median per capita incomes in the same Gallup study were around $15,000. Of MENA countries, Israel has the highest median per capita income at $7,847 followed by Kuwait. Incomes in Qatar, KSA and UAE are lower but approaching the income levels of the top three MENA countries. Elsewhere median incomes are very low; in Egypt the Gallup study indicates a median per capita income of $623. All of this suggests that a resident middle class is yet to emerge in the region as a source of demand for air travel.
Internet Usage
The internet has played an important role in the historic development of LCCs because it facilitated a simplified pricing structure and online sales and distribution thereby eliminating traditional travel agencies as intermediaries. The ability to do this relies on a population that has access to and is comfortable with making online purchases. 8 Internet usage is very high in the Gulf states; in Bahrain, Qatar and UAE 90% of the population are using the internet. 9 Saudia
Arabia has a lower percentage of internet users (64%) but usage grew 34% between 2011 and 2014. In contrast, only 32% of Egypt's population were internet users in 2014; a figure that was nevertheless 23% higher than 2011. Iran also has a lower percentage of internet users (39% in 2014), but usage is growing fast with a 107% increase over 2011. More generally, forecasts of online travel market growth in the Middle East region appear to be positive.
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Urban Development and Geography
The degree of urban development combined with geographic dispersion and concentrations of population can provide an indication of the potential for growth in domestic short haul air travel within the MENA region. Table 3 shows the total population, the percentage of the total population living in urban agglomerations of more than one million people, the number of large and medium sized cities and the number of airport cities located at least 350km from the city with the largest airport (based on passenger volumes). show a significant degree of urban development and a potential for growth in domestic air travel.
With a total population of around 31 million people, KSA has a significant amount of urban development with 46% of the population living in relatively large cities. In addition, there are eight airport cities located at least 350km from Jeddah. Iran with a large population of around 78 million currently has 13 cities with a population of more than 500,000 with 26% of the population living in large urban areas. In addition to urban concentrations, Iran has 10 airport cities that are at least 350km from Tehran. Egypt also has potential in this regard, with nine cities more than 350Km from Cairo however the country does not perform well on any of the other indicators.
In addition to the measures of urban development and geography, one can also consider the state and development of the airport network within a country. Iran and KSA have a larger numbers of passengers spread across several airports, while UAE demonstrates its hub role with a very large volume of passengers distributed over a cluster of three proximate airports. Egypt and to some extent Morocco and Tunisia also have domestic airport networks in which capacity is diffused rather than concentrated at one location. Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the recent trend in spending by foreign visitors. While foreign visitor spending is growing in some Gulf states, not surprisingly, it represents a small part of the economies of oil exporting countries, remaining steadily at or below 5% of the value of total exports since the mid-2000's.
Spending by Foreign Visitors
12 For oil importing MENA countries, spending by foreign visitors represents a more important sector of the economy, ranging from 5% (Israel) to 35% (Jordan). 
Air Transport Liberalization
An important element in creating opportunities for LCCs is the liberalization of air transport markets (Itani, O'Connell and Mason, 2015) . In Europe the evolution of LCCs occurred in tandem with liberalization (Mason Morrison and Stockman, 2013) and there can be little doubt that the removal of restrictive bilaterals have had a significant impact on the success of the LCC business model. Gulf countries is almost double that of high income OECD countries; a result which reflects a relative lack of success in achieving intra-regional liberalization in air transport, despite attempts in both Africa and the Middle East to do so.
In 1999, the Council of Arab Transport Ministers formed an agreement to liberalize air transport through a gradual easing of regional restrictions on Middle-Eastern carriers in existing air service agreements. Schlumberger and Weisskopf (2012) report that following the 1999 agreement, some 17 'open skies' agreements (OSA's) were signed between a subset of Arab countries and in 2004, a regional OSA (the 'Arab League Open Skies Agreement') was 13 Whether liberalization was a sufficient rather than a necessary condition for the magnitude of success enjoyed by LCCs in Europe is more complex question to answer because there were other contemporaneous elements which contributed to the growth of LCCs. Internet technology and aircraft leasing became predominant in the 1990's and both allowed LCCs to enter the market and compete more easily and effectively with incumbent legacy carriers. In addition, several negative shocks (the outbreak of SARS, September 11 th attacks and the Iraq war for example) contemporaneously weakened the competitive position of full service carriers. 18 Fifth freedom of the air is the right of an airline to carry passengers from its home country to country A, then pick up passengers and fly to country B. An example would be the right of Saudia to fly from Riyadh to London (where passengers enplane) and then on to New York. Sixth freedom rights enable an airline to carry passengers from country B via its home country en route to country A. An example would be the right of Emirates to pick up passengers in Mumbai, then fly to Dubai and then on to London. 19 The signatories to Air service agreements in UAE are often individual emirates or combinations of emirates within the federation and so it is difficult to ascertain which agreements apply to which emirates. To date I have been unsuccessful in finding any source which catalogues the signatories and details of these agreements. Table 6 ). 
LCCs in the MENA Region
In any air transport market, one might reasonably expect to observe both entry and exit of LCCs over time, both as fighting brands created by traditional incumbents and as newly created airlines. Mason et al (2013) indicate that between 1995 and 2010, a total of 110 airlines entered the European market as LCCs of which 39 evolved from or were created by existing (traditional)
carriers. By 2010 only 32 LCCs in total and only nine out of the 39 'evolved' airlines were still in operation. Of the 78 LCCs that exited the European market, 30 were in business for one year or less. 26 While at an earlier stage in the development of the low cost sector, the MENA region has also witnessed both successful and unsuccessful attempts to enter the LCC sector. Table 6 shows the growth in passenger volumes for MENA-based 'LCC' carriers currently in operation. 27 More recently, Israel's flag carrier El Al has also adopted the fighting brand strategy with the creation of a new LCC subsidiary named 'UP' which began operations in 2014. 28 Moroccan investors in Jet4you included Attijariwafa Bank; one of the largest banking and financial groups in Morocco. 29 Jetairfly is the trading name of TUI Airlines Belgium. A high degree of variability in passenger growth is evident in the CAGR for these airlines. Jazeera, which is more focused on intra-region markets has the lowest CAGR while Flydubai which has focused on coordinating inter-regional flights with longhaul carriers has enjoyed an impressive 60.5 % CAGR. Both Air Arabia and FlyNas have also enjoyed strong growth. Are these differences in growth rates a result of a different strategic approach's within an overall LCC business model? Consider Europe's most successful LCCs (easyJet and Ryanair) as a benchmark with which to compare the business strategies of MENA-based 'LCCs'. As a first pass we compare characteristics which are commonly used to distinguish LCCs from traditional 'full service' carriers. Williams et al (2003) . 31 Prior to fall 2014 flynas included long-haul flights in its route network and consequently had a mixed fleet and longer average stage lengths. However, in 2014 flynas ceased scheduled long-haul flights to focus on short-haul and has moved to a uniform fleet (Airbus A320). Table 7 with easyJet and Ryanair. The Air Arabia Group currently has a 95 destinations, of which 46 are within the MENA region, 17 are to EU countries and Switzerland and 32 are to other international destinations including Urumqui in China (a route that falls within the range of its A320 aircraft). Air Arabia has negotiated rights to serve other more distant Chinese cities but has elected to wait until future generations of the A320 aircraft have a sufficient range to reach them rather than deviate from operating a single aircraft type.
MENA-based LCCs That Have Not Survived
MENA-based LCCs currently in operation
This aversion to operating a mixed fleet appears to be one of the core elements of the LCC sector (see Table 7 ).
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While Air Arabia seems to be following more closely in the footsteps of easyJet and Ryanair compared with other MENA-based 'LCCs' there are some more subtle differences. For example, while Air Arabia offers a single economy cabin, its seating density is significantly lower than either easyJet or Ryanair (between 162-168 seats with an interior seating design that offers a seat pitch of 32 inches which is above average for economy seats).
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Benchmarking LCC business models
To look more closely at LCC strategies in the MENA region as compared with European LCCs, we employ a benchmarking framework for consistently assessing the business models of 32 flynas experimented with a operating a mixed fleet which included wider body aircraft as part of a strategy to offer low cost, long haul service to some Asian cities -a strategy that it eventually abandoned in 2014. 33 This compares with 30 inches and 29 inches for Ryanair and easyJet respectively. airlines as first suggested by Morrison & Mason (2006) , operationalised by Mason and Morrison (2008) and extended by Mason, Morrison and Stockman (2013) . The analysis takes a 'product and organizational architecture' (POA) approach to assess how product/service design, benefit drivers (value creation), input choice and cost efficiency interact with a firm's organizational design to generate profits. 34 A conceptual illustration of POA analysis is provided below in As suggested in Figure 4 the design of a firm's product or service offering will define a core product bundle that creates consumer surplus (i.e. creates value) relative to the firm's pricing strategy which in turn is influenced by the market structure. Additionally however, product design also has implications for costs of production (which impacts pricing strategy) and
organizational structure (what is produced internally and what is contracted out for example)
Taken together, both product and organizational architecture contribute to the creation and sustainability of profits.
As an implementation of POA analysis, Morrison and Mason (2006) developed a set of measurable indices to capture the inter-relationships between an airline's core product, its cost and revenue structure, productivity factors, airports characteristics and market structure. 35 These 34 See Mason and Morrison (2008) for a more detailed discussion of the POA model as it relates to airline business strategy 35 Complete details of the methodology and calculation of indices can be found in Mason and Morrison (2008) .
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descriptors of the business strategy are then related to the overall cost structure and the ability to generate revenues and ultimately profits. Ten market, performance and product indices are built using 37 individual data items for each of the airlines incorporated in the benchmark analysis (see the Appendix). What emerges is a representation of each airline's business strategy, relative to other benchmarked airlines.
With regard an airline's core product bundle, the analysis focuses on three key sets of elements that create consumer value: connectivity, convenience and comfort. Connectivity refers to the type and extent of the airline's route network. Increased connectivity holds value for consumers but can also increase costs. Connectivity is measured using three components; network density (departures per airport per day), number of routes offered and all destinations offered at airports served. These three indices thus measure the value proposition inherent in the service that an airline elects to provide for its customers.
The convenience index is composed of average weekly frequency per route, average distance of airports from the nearest population centre, the percentage of flights from 'primary' airports, punctuality (percentage of on-time departures and arrivals) and a baggage service quality rating (provided by Skytrax). 36 Lastly, the comfort index is composed of four elements; average number of passengers per flight, number of cabin crew per flight, economy seat width and economy seat pitch.
In addition to these indices, indices for aircraft productivity, labour productivity, airport attractiveness, distribution and market structure are also constructed. Finally, indices are calculated for overall costs, revenues and profitability. 37 As outlined in Mason and Morrison (2008) , correlation coefficients between individual elements in each index and operating profits can be calculated and used as weights in the construction of each overall index value. These indices are then benchmarked against the 'best-in-class' for a reference group of airlines. What emerges is a representation of each airline's business strategy, relative to the other carriers in the reference group.
Mason, Morrison and Stockman (2013) use this approach to characterize two distinct stylized business models within the LCC sector. They term these the 'truly low cost' model and the 'full 19 service competitor' model. The 'truly low cost' model is a business strategy with an unflinching focus on low costs. The elements of this model are as follows:
• Costs drive everything -be the lowest cost competitor • Fly to secondary airports • Offer low levels of convenience, comfort and connectivity • Strive for high aircraft utilization and productivity • Strive for low aircraft maintenance costs (fleet uniformity)
• Strive for high labour productivity • Offer low fares • Compete aggressively on price to achieve market power in city-pair markets • Trade off lower margins against high volumes and low costs to achieve profitability This low cost focused business strategy is illustrated relative to the index categories developed by Mason and Morrison (2008) using a 'spider web' diagram as shown in Figure 5 where the outer perimeter of the web represents a 'best-in-class' score for each index. In Mason and
Morrison (2008) the measured indices for Ryanair look strikingly similar to this stylized model as shown below in Figure 6 . An alternative to the 'truly low cost' business strategy is the 'full service competitor' strategy (Mason Morrison and Stockman, 2013) which is focused less on cost and more on revenue generation and the capturing of market share for business travel. Source: Mason and Morrison (2008) Key elements of the 'full service competitor' model (illustrated below in Figure 7 ) are:
• Offer higher levels of comfort, convenience, connectivity (compared with 'truly low cost') • Fly to select primary airports • Not focused on having the lowest costs, but striving to have lower costs than FS competitors • Attempt to capture share in the business travel market • Strive for lower costs through contracting out, operating a point-to-point network, operating a uniform fleet and efficient sales/distribution
The indices for easyJet calculated by Mason and Morrison (2008) (see Figure 8 ) map closely with this stylized 'full service competitor' model. While more focused on revenue generation, easyJet has retained several LCC characteristics.
Comparing Air Arabia to easyJet and Ryanair
The benchmarking analysis of LCC business strategies as outlined above can be employed to get a better picture of how a MENA-based LCC's business model is positioned relative to those of successful LCCs in Europe. Ideally we would want to include all the MENA-based airlines in this analysis however, Air Arabia is the only publicly traded company in the MENA region that. Source: Mason and Morrison (2008) 22 provides fully audited accounts of sufficient detail. Consequently, for the remainder of this paper we focus on Air Arabia
To compare the business model of Air Arabia with those of easyJet and Ryanair, we have recalculated benchmarking indices using updated 2010 and 2014 data. The strategy map based on 2010 data suggests that Air Arabia has not followed either the 'truly low cost' model or the 'full service competitor' model but instead has followed a hybrid strategy. The measured indexes for Air Arabia are illustrated below in figure 9.
When compared with the strategies for Ryanair and easyJet, we can see that, Air Arabia's strategy is markedly different. Air Arabia's Labour and aircraft productivity indexes are low. In the former case, available seat kilometers per employee is half that of Ryanair's in 2010. While
Air Arabia does achieve relatively high aircraft utilisation, the number of sectors flown per day is lower than either Ryanair or easyJet which reduces its productive capacity. 23 sales channels which lowers the productivity of its sales and distribution index. In area of comfort, Air Arabia clearly offers higher levels of comfort compared to either easyJet or Ryanair. This is because of their higher seat pitch and smaller number of seats (162) (163) (164) (165) (166) (167) (168) compared to 180 for easyJet (being increased to 186 in 2016) and 189 for Ryanair. The extra comfort may translate into higher revenues for Air Arabia, but it also contributes to a higher cost per seat. Air Arabia also delivers a high level of convenience mainly because most of the airports it serves are primary airports coupled with a high punctuality rating. The market structure and airport attractiveness index measures for Air Arabia as reported here are incomplete (due to lack of data availability) however in 2010 the airline had little direct competition on many of its citypair markets (based from Sharjah). This helps to generate market power and keeps fares higher than they would be with more direct competition. In terms of airport attractiveness, the airline is dominant at its base in Sharjah where it and has a 50% ownership stake and which keeps its airport costs low, however this is counterbalanced to some degree by its destination airports, all of which are large with many airline customers (lower airline bargaining power) and a significant number of full service airline competitors. This latter aspect of airport attractiveness is not fully represented in this calculation of the index (again due to data limitations).
Air Arabia in 2014
Business models, especially those in the airline industry, are not static but evolve over time. displace Ryanair as 'best-in-class' in terms of airport attractiveness and market structure.
However, these results should be treated with caution due to data limitations and the fact that Sharjah and Dubai International are treated as different city-pair elements. While our benchmarking analysis suggests that Air Arabia is not following either of the stylized models associated with Ryanair and easyJet, Air Arabia is closer to the 'full service competitor' conceptual model given its comfort and convenience levels which enable the airline to compete with large full service carriers in the region. The airline is able to charge higher prices for this service value to some degree but has higher costs as a consequence. authorities. The elimination of fuel subsidies and the easing of price caps on domestic routes in KSA will pave the way for LCCs to take more market share away from the state carrier in the same manner that occurred in Morocco and is now occurring in Israel.
The apparent inability to advance regional liberalization in the Middle East and Africa, and the continued temptation to protect state-owned or flag-carrying carriers will inhibit the growth of the low cost sector. In the absence of broad regional liberalization, we can still expect more bilateral 'open skies' agreements. Tunisia is favoured to be the next MENA country to sign an OSA with Europe and more could follow. However as has been pointed out elsewhere, OSA's that provide unrestricted access to markets are only a partial element that should be expanded to include relaxation of ownership and control rules.
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Our analysis of business strategies suggests that in general, MENA-based 'LCCs' while retaining some core characteristics of the low cost model (single aircraft type and point-to-point networks) also differ in some important areas (multiple cabin classes, use of secondary airports). 
